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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J<~DW ARD ~WILSON AMMERMAN,
hy his Guardian Ad Litem, La Verna

Bruce Ammerman, and EDDIE
SOLIZ,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE
gXCHANGE,
Defendant and Appellant.

t
\

~

Case No.
10,574:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATRMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs and respondent against
defendant and appellant to recover the amount of a
judgment in favor of Eddie Soliz and against Edward
Wilson Ammennan in excess o.f the liability insurance
prnvided by Farmers Insurance Exchange.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs and against defendant. Judgment in accordance with the jury verdict was entered by the Court on
February -±, 1966, N unc Pro Tune to January 11, 1966.
1
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After the return of the jury verdict defendant made
the following motions: (1) For Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict, (2) For a New Trial, and (3) To
Set Aside, Amend and Correct the Judgment, all of which
motions were denied. Thereafter defendant initiated this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent seeks to have the action of the trial court
affirmed in entering judgment on the jury verdict and
in denying appellant's several motions.
STATEMENT OF F.A:CTS
On March 21 1962, Edward Wilson Anunerman was
an insured and entitled to the benefits and coverages of
an automobile liability insurance policy No. 76-662554797,
issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange and which pro~
vided, among other things, indemnity for injury to other
persons with a limit of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per
accident arising from the operation of an automible
('Rl, 13, 100). On that date, while operating an automobile, Mr. Ammerman collided with an automobile
owned and operated by plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, causing
personal injury to him and damage to his automobile.
Suit was filed by Mr. Soliz against Mr. Ammerman
in the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking damages for personal injuries in the sum of $35,000 (Exhibit
P-4). At that time Farmers Insurance Exchange retained
the law firm o.f Hanson and Garrett to def end Mr.
Ammerman, pursuant to the terms of the policy (R56 2
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Part I of insurance policy) requiring it to do so. Mr.
Ammerman retained Attorney Reed Richards of the
law firm of McKay and Burton to represent him in the
matter, and more particularly in relation to the claim
in excess of the policy limits (Exhibit P-5).
Shortly after the accident, Mr. Soliz was seen and
E'xamined by Dr. David E. Smith, Jr., a general practitioner in Salt Lake City. Because of Mr. Soliz' continued
difficulty with neck and back pain Dr. Smith suspected
an injury in that area and ref erred him to Dr. D. C.
Bernson, a reputable and respected neurosugeon in Salt
Lake City. Dr. Bernson examined Mr. Soliz on at least
four occasions between May 23, 1962 and September 24,
1962 (Exhibit P-7). In addition to the complete physical
examination, Dr. Bernson also performed a discogram
on Mr. Soliz while the latter was a patient in the L.D.S.
Hospital for that purpose, and examined x-rays taken
by Dr. Irwin F. Winters and x-rays that he had ordered
taken.
Following the initial physical examination of Mr.
Soliz and examination of the x-rays, Dr. Bernson detected
an increase in motion between the 5th and 6th cervical
vertebra (Exhibit P-7). At the time of the second examination on June 20, 1962, he detected an increase in grip
strength in the left hand and a grip decrease in the right
hand. There was also a weakening of the left and right
bicepts reflex. At the third examination on August 4,
1962, because of Mr. Soliz' continued difficulty with back
and neck pain, and because there was a marked loss of
strength in the right upper extremity to 40 lbs. which

3
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represented a 55 lh., loss smce the prior examination
of June 20, 1962, Dr. Bernson was o.f the opinion that
Mr. Soliz could vt>ry well have had a ruptured disc or
discs and he, therefore, suggested hospitalization for a
few days for diagnostic studies to definitely ascertain
whether or not the discs were ruptured a.nd to give him
a better indication as to the prognosis.
On Septt>mber 24 1062, Mr. Soliz was admitted to the
L.D.S. Hospital, and on September 25, 1962, Dr. Bernson
perfornwd a cPrvical discogram on him. He reported
that in the performance of the discogram insufficient
dyP was used between the 6th and 7th cervical vertebra
and that bt>cause of this the doctor was under the impression at that time, that the disc between the 6th and 7th
cervical vertebra was normal. Dr. Bernson did not state
that insuf fiicent dye was used between the 5th and 6th
vertebra in thP performance of the dicogram, but only
between the 6th and 7th vertebra (Exhibit P-7).
After the discogram was performed, and m consideration of the clinical findings suggested by the
confirmation of the cervical discogram, Dr. Bernson
diagnosed :Mr. Soliz' injury, stating unequivocally that
he had two ruptured cervical discs attributable to the
injury of March 21, 1962.
At the time of the trial, Mr. Soliz testified of the
pain he suffered, the intensity and duration of it, the
disability he suffered, and the continued treatment rPquired by him in an effort tn get rt>lief. In this regard
he stated that following the accident and over the next
month or so his baek, neek, arms and hands would ache
4
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and that he could hardly move them until he moved
around for a while; that he was required to wear a
plastic neck collar for from six to eight weeks; that during thP disco.gram he was in terrific pain, was numb and
thought he was paralyzed; that his condition failed to
improve as of the date of trial, and that by reason of his
injuries he was unable to report to work regularly to his
Pmployment and lost 172 hours of time from work. He
also testified that because he was unable to perform the
cluti('s of his employment a change of job was necessary,
duP to his injury and disability.
Tn addition to the pain and suffering experienced by
Mr. Soliz, in relation to disability, he stated that he
\ms unable to walk as he did before the accident, was
unable to sit for any period of time without becoming
restless requiring him to get up and walk around, was
nnabh• to drive his car for any long distances as he did
prior to the accident, did not have the energy he had
before the accident, his sleeping habits were different in
that since the accident he could not sleep through the
night, was unable to go to dances as he did before, unable
to go camping and fishing as before, was unable to go
on a planned vacation during the summer following the
accident, was unable to do the normal yard wo·rk around
his home as he did prior to the accident, the normal association which a father enjoys particularly with sons the
ag·t• of the Soliz boys in that he was unable to play ball
with them, go on canyon trips, take them to the gym, etc.

The medical expenses incurred by Mr. Soliz for
treatment of his injuries was $499.65 (Exhibt P-11); and
5
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the operation which Dr. Bernson said Mr. Soliz would
need to remove the ruptured discs would coot between
$800 and $1,050.
This testimony of Mr. Soliz was also borne out at
the trial by the testimony of his wife, who testified about
the ·pain and disability of her husband from the time
of the accident to the time of the trial.
On September 11, 1963, at the request of Farmers
Insurance Exchange, an independent medical examination of Mr. Soliz was performed by Dr. Reed S. Clegg,
an orthopedic surgeon in Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit
P-6). Dr. Clegg saw Mr. Soliz on one occasion only, at
which time he had x-rays taken which he examined.
However, he did not examine the x-rays taken by Dr.
Winters or Dr. Benson (T-168 Soliz vs. Ammerman). At
the time of this examination Mr. Soliz related his physical difficulties to Dr. Clegg, who located tenderness in
the lower cervical and upper thoracic spine and in the
lumbosacral region of his back. Pressure on these areas
produced pain. Mr. Soliz also lacked 12 inches of touching the floor with his fingers while holding his knees
extended.
X-ray of the cervical spine showed bony irregularity
about the fourth, fifth and sixth vertebra with some bone
bridging anteriorly between the fourth and fifth vertebral bodies. There was also a small fleck of calcification
posterior to the posterior spinous process of the fifth
cervical vertebra. X-rays of the thoracic and lumbosacral spine showed bony irregularity, calcium deposits and
some osteoarthritic changes.
6
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After his examination Dr. Clegg diagnosed Mr.
Soliz' injury as moderate, chronic osteoarthritis of the
cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine. He also stated that
the patient had somewhat more extensive bone and joint
C'hanges than a man of thirty-nine years of age, but
that these were within normal limits. The changes, Dr.
Clegg said, represented degeneration, or wear and tear
changes, and were not considered by him to be the result
of a single accident, such as described as occurring on
March 21, 1962 (Exhibit P-6, page 3).
As part of its investigative program, Farmers Insurance Exchange hired a private investigator to conduct an activity check on Mr. Soliz and report to them.
'rhe activity check was conducted by a private investigator, but he was not called to testify at the trial relative to the findings of his invesigation, nor was his report
introduced into evidence (Exhibit P-1). The introducton of the report was never attempted or sought by the
insurance company at the trial.
On April 5, 1963, the insurance company's counsel
wrote and sent to the company an "Opinion As to Liability" and "Recommendations As To Value And Settlement" (Exhibit P-3). In that document the insurance
company was advised that the attorney classified the
case as one of liability. On the aspect of settlement
value the attorney reviewed the report and findings of
Dr. Bernson in relation to the ruptured discs. The company was advised at that time that if Mr. Soliz did not
have a herniated disc the case had a settlement value of
$3,500. If he did have a herniated disc the case was

7
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valued at $8,500. A settlement of $6,000 was recommPnded at that time.
On April 10, 1963, Mr. R. .T. Hadley, Branch Claim:-;
~Ianager of Farmers Insurance Exchange, wrote a letter
to its legal counsPl stating that "The facts indicate that
we have very little to talk about liabiity-wise, however,
the injuries }wing complained of need to be verified
before WP arP ready to entPr into any negotiations for
settlement." (Exhibit P-15).
On May 29, 1%3, an intPr-off ice memo from :\Ir. R
.J. HadlPy, the Salt Lah Branch Claims Manager, to a
:\fr. George S. Newberry, apparently the Regional Claims
:\fanager, stated "In view of Dr. Bc>rnson's findings, it
appears that we an' going to have a rather difficult
time def ending this casP, if we do not come up some
medical testimon)' which will refute his presPnt diagnosis." The memo further stated that the company
had not been able to come up with any information indicating that the injuries pre-existed the accident, and if
Dr. Bernson's findings were confinned l\Ir. Hadley would
place a value of $7,500 on tlw claim. At that time Mr.
Hadley changed the company rpservPs to $5,000 on the
claim.
Plaintiff's Exhibit #10 is a company inter-office
correspondence document from Mr. Hadley to Mr. Newberry, dated June 10, 1963. The rt>servPs are shown to
be $5,000 on the claim of l\f r. Soliz, and a trial date of
September 4, 1963. It also shows a demand of $9,000
on the claim of Mr. Soliz aud indicates no offer had
been made by the company.
8
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Prior to the time of the trial of the Soliz vs. Ammer111011 cmw plaintiff by and through his counsel communieah·d an off Pr of sPttlPment of $9,000 to Farmers Insurance Exchange (R-311, T-177). After the trial was over,
hut hefore the jury returnPd its verdict, an offer of settlement in the amount of $10,000 was made to the insuranee compnay (R-311, T-177). Both offers were rejected.
'l'IH• highest offer of settlemPnt ever received by Mr.
Soliz from the insurance company was the sum of $4-,500
(H-1G5, T-28, R-311, T-177).
At the trial of the instant case plaintiffs called two
attornP)'S as expert witnesses in relation to the evaluation of Mr. Soliz's claim, for settlement purposes, in
tlH• Soliz vs. Ammerman case. The first attorney witlless called by plaintiffs was L. E. Midgley, a Salt Lake
attorn<')' with considerable insurance claims and insurance def PnSP experience. He asserted that after receipt
of Dr. Bernson's report, in his opinion, the claim had a
reasonable sPttlement value of $7,500, and he would have
iw~mmncmded settlement of the claim for that figure at
that timP. He also testified that he would have recommended the company pay $10,000, if necessary, to avoid
trial (R-:238, T-10:3) ..Mr. l\lidgley testified that in this
particular cas<' hP would have expected a jury verdict
anywhPrP from $10,000 to $15,000 (R-239, T-10-1).
ThP sPcond attorney expert witness called by plaintiffs ,rns Tel Charlier, of Salt Lake City, and a partner
in the law firm that rPprPsented plaintiff Eddie Soliz
in the Soliz vs. Aumwnnan acton and the instant case.
l\fr. Charier is also an attornPy with eonsiderable insur9
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ance claims and personal injury trial defense experience
(R-269-273, T-134-139). After acquainting himself with
all the aspects of this case, Mr. Charlier made an evaluation of claim just before trial. In his opinion the case
had a settlement value at that time of bebveen $10,000
and $12,000 (R-309, T-175).
Defendant called two expert attorney witnesses to
testify relative. to the evaluation of the claim. They were
~Ir. Gordon R. Strong and Mr. Harold Christensen, both
Salt Lake City attorneys specializing in personal injury
defense for insurance companies. Mr. Strong stated that,
in his opinion, if the jury believed Dr. Bernson's testimony and report in its entirety he would have anticipated a verdict of a.bout $7,500 (R-282, T-147). If the
jury believed Dr. ·Clegg's testimony and report in its
entirety he would have anticipated a verdict of around
$2,000 to $2,500 (R-283, T-148). However, it was his
opinion that the jury \vould not believe either doctor entirely, and on that basis said he would have anticipated
a verdict of around $5,000 to $6,000; and before trying
the case he would have attempted to settle it in the area
of $5,000 to $6,000 (R-283, T-148). l\Ir. Christensen testified that after he had read the reports of Drs. Bernson
and Clegg and read Mr. Soliz' deposition, he evaluated
plaintiff's claim at between $6,000 and $7,500 (R-331-332,
T-179-180).
After hearing all of the testimony from all the witnesses in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of l\Ir. Soliz and against Mr. Ammerman for the sum of $15,HG.2G, plus court costs of $76.00
10
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(H-2). The policy limits of $10,000 was eventually paid
on the judgment by Farmers Insurance Exchange. Upon
the refu~al of the company to pay the judgment in excess
of the policy limits plaintiffs filed this action to compel
payme-nt of that amount. At the conclusion of the evidence defendant made a motion for a directed verdict,
which the Court denied. A special verdict was submitted to which was answered as follows:
In refusing to settle the Soliz-Ammerman case,
did this defendant act in bad faith in either of the
following particulars?
(a) Prior to trial when it could have settled
the case for $9,000?
Answer Yes.
( b) At the trial and before the verdict was
returned by the jury when it could have
settled the case for $10,000?
Answer Yes. (R-120)
Dt>fendant's subsequent motions for a new trial and
for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict were also
denied hy the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER
COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT BY THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL.

The cases are legion supporting the general proposition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it
applies to the instant case. No cases have been found by
n•spondent stating a contrary position.
11
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Not only is thpre a prl'Sumption of validity on appeal of the judgment and proceedings in the lower court,
but the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to dPrnonstrate error, and in thE~ absence of such the judgment
must be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead vs.
'Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry, 2
LT.2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Again, on appeal the judgment
of the trial court is pre~mmptively correct and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate
court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operative Merca11tilc Instit11tion, 122 li.360, 249 P.2d 514; Nagle vs.
Club FontainlJlcu, 17 U.2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty vs.
Gindy Man11far:i1tri11g Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, +04 P.2d
30.
This proposition of law is correct and is binding
upon the appellate court whether the proceedings in the
lower court are bPfore a judge only or a judge and jury.
And thP rulp seems to have even more weight in the
latter instanee. When the trial court has given its approval to the detPrmination by the jury by refusing to
grant a nPw trial to the losing party, the appellate court
will look upon the judgment of the trial court with some
degree of verity with a presumption in favor of its validity, and again the burden is upon the appellant to
show souw rwrsuasive reason for upsPtting it. Gordon vs.
Prom City, 15 U.2d 287, :391 P.2d -±30. In the same vein,
it has been held that whPre a jury trial has been had
and a motion for a npw trial deniPd to the losing party,
the presumption:-; arP in favor of the judgment entered
and the SupremP Court will not (listnrh that judgment
unlPss the appellant llll'ets the lmrden of showing Prror
12
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and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. Lemmon
ns. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
9 U.2d 195, 341 P.2d 215.
Otlwr cases supporting this proposition are Charlton
rs. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176; Universal Investment Company vs. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d
564; Taylor vs.Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 389 P.2d 382; Wendel/we rs. Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 178; Hadley
rs. Wood, 9 U.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197; Daisy Distributors,
I11c. vs. Local Union 976, Joint Cowncil 67, Western Conference of Teamsters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE
CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE.

Tlw direction of a verdict in favor of one of the
1iarties hy the trial court is proper only in the absence
of any question of fact or when required by law. In this
regard, a verdict should be directed only where, by giving
the party against whom it is directed the benefit of the
most favorable vie\Y of the evidence, the verdict against
him is demanded. 53 Am. Jnr., Trial Section 357 et seq.
Tlwre is no question that the good or bad faith of an
imrnranrP carrier is a question for determination by the
jury. See Southern Fre & Casnalty Company t'S. Norris,
35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1951). Certainly in
thP instant case reasonable minds could have differed on
thP question of defendant's good faith from the evidence
JH'PS<'nted and, accordingly, the trial court properly refused to direct a v<>rdict in favor of the insurance company and against plaintiffs.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jn submitting tlw ease to the jury the trial comt
instructed th"' jurors in Instruction #12:
. . . The only issue before you in this case is
whether or not the Farmers Insurance Exchange
is liable to the plaintiffs for that amount by which
the judgment in the action brought by Eddie Soliz
and ~~dward Wilson Ammerman exceeds the coverage provided in the policy of defendant, Farnters Insurance Exchange, by reason of the fact that
the defendant was guilty of bad faith, in that it
failed to settle the Soliz claim prior to trial when
it could have setted for $9,000 or, when that offer
was withdrawn at trial, it failed to settle before
the jury returned the verdict, for $10,000 (R-100,
101).
In relation to bad faith, Instruction #11 advised the jury:
"Bad faith" as used herein means the opposite
of good faith, generally implying or involving aetual or constructive fraud or a design to mislead
or deceive another or a neglect or refusal to fulfil
some duty or some contractual obligation not
prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights
or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive (R-99).

rnstruction #f)

is as follmvs:
You should not ignore or disregard the testimony
of any witness, whether for the plaintiff or for
thP defendant, or whether or not such witness
is a party to the action or is interested in the
result thereof, simply because of such fact; but
you may take all the facts into consideration in
detennining the credibility of any witness. The
testimony of each witness should be considered
fairly an<l impartially an<l he given such weight
and pffect as you think it is entitled to, measured
hy reason and common sense and the standards
given you in these instructions for determining
14
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tlw weight and credibility of witnesses generally
(H-9G).

It is true that m the majority of the cases which
havP passed upon the q1w:-1tion, the courts havP held that
a liahilit~· insurPr, having assumed control of the right
of settlPment of clai1m; against the insured, may become
liable in excess of its undertaking under the policy provisions if it fails to Pxercise "good faith" in considering
offrrs to compromise the claim within the policy limits.
f-i<'P -Hl A.L.R.2d l 78 and the cases cited there. A large
nmnlwr of jurisdictions have held that there may be Jiahilit~' on the part of the insurPr for negligence in rejecting a reasonable cornpromisP offer. Id. at 186. While
there are many courts and decisions that agree that the
inl"nn'r must exercise good faith toward the insured
in rPlation to suits filed against it and settlement thereof,
tlwre is disagreement as to just what degree of considPration for the insured 's interest is involved in the
"good-faith concept." However, probably all jurisdictions accept the rule that the insurer is bound to give
some consideration to the insured's interests. 40 A.L.R.
2d 1'71.

TherP is also little question that negligence is an element to be considerPd in ascertaining bad faith.
l'nder Point I of its brief appellant asserts at page
7 thereof that in the case of Brown vs. Guarantee Insuraw·e Company, 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 Pac. 2d 69
( 1958) thP court summed up from cases on bad faith and
laid drl\\'n seven factors as constituent parts of bad
faith, viz:
15
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1. AttPmpts hy the insurer to get the insured
to contribute to settlenwnt.
:2. Failure of the insurt>r to investigate the
case sufficiently to ascertain the evidence agairn;t
the insured.
3. Rejection by the insurer of its agent's or
attorney's advice.

+. Failure of the insurer to inform the insured of the settlement offers.

5. Participation by the insured by acquiescing in the insurer's conduct of the defense, or
misleading the insurer as to the facts.
6. The amount of financial risk earh party
is exposed to.
7. The strength of the respective sides as to
liability and damages.
RespondPnts respectfully assert that the Brown case
does not hold that these elements are necessary concurring constituent elements of bad faith, nor is it the
law that they are. See -t-0 A.L.R.2d 171. When it comes
to the question of what particular acts, conduct, or circmnstances are sufficient to charge the insurer with liability for its failure to settle a claim within the policy
limits, the courts have found or sustained findings of
bad faith on any one of the dt'ments stated and on other
elements or bases not included in this list, and have not
demandt'd the presence of all seven t'lements in one case.
As a mattt'r of fact, it is not necessary that any one of
the elt'rnents listed b0 prt>sent in order to support a
finding of bad faith on thP part of the insurer, so long
as ther(~ arc> facts upon which a Jury can reasonably
make a finding of bad faith.

16
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In an attempt to formulate a satisfactory test as to
what degree of consideration for the insured's interest
is entailed in the exercise of good faith, (1) some courts
have indicated that in the absence of actual fraud or
misrepresentation the insurer is entitled to regard its
own interest as paramount, (2) other courts have said
that the interest of the insured must be given equal consideration, (3) and at least one court has taken the position that in the event of a conflict of interest the insured's
interest must be given priority. 40 A.L.R.2d 181 et. Seq.
The rule as to good faith was stated by the court
in National Mutual Casualty Company vs. Britt, 203 Okla.
175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948) to the effect that in considering an offer of settlement, the insurer was bound to
give the rights of the insured at least as much consideration as it did its own in determining whether or not
to effect a settlement.
In the case of Amercan Fidelity & Casualty Company vs. G. A. Nichols Companys, (1949, C.A. 10th Okla.)
173 F.2d 830, the court said that a liability insurance
company having an irrevocable power to determine
whether an offer of compromise of a claim should be
accepted or rejected is in a fiduciary relationship with
the insured and owes the duty of exercising the utmost
good faith toward the insured, and while it may profitably give consideration to its own interest in considering
a compromse offer, it must, in good faith, give at least
equal consideration to the interest of the insured. To the
the same effect is American Fidelity & Casualty Company
vs. American Bus Lines, Inc., (1951), C.A. 10th Okla.)
19 F.2d 234, cert den 342 U.S 851, 96 L.Ed.642, 72 S.Ct. 79.
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Southern Fire & Casu.alty Compamy L's Norris, :-l5
Tenn. A pp. 657, 250 S. W .2d 785 ( 1951) is to the effed
that while an insurer is under no duty to comprornisP
a claim for the sole benefit of its insured if to continrn•
the fight offers a fair and reasonable prospect of escaping liability or of getting off for less than the policy
limit, thf' insured also has a right to assume that hi1'
interest will not be abandoned merely becausP the insurer faces tlw prospect of a full loss, the relation between the insurer and the insured being one of trust
calling for reciprocity of action, and if the proof, in the
light of all the relevant circumstances and inferences,
is such as to eave a reasonable basis for disagreement
among reasonable minds, the question of good faith is
for the jury.

In Tiger River Pipe Company vs. Maryland C<isu.alty Company, 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491 (1931) the
trial court sustained, as against a demurrer, a complaint
charging the defendant insurer with both negligence and
bad faith in rejecting a compromise offer within the
policy limits. On a latter appeal Tiger River Pipe Company vs. Maryland Casualty Company, 170 S.C. 286, 170
S.E. 346, a verdict for the insured was sustained, the
court apparently holding that there was evidence to go
to the jury on both the issues of negligence and bad
faith, but expressly stating that the jury had found the
defendant insurer guilty of bad faith. The court rejected the contention that in considering a compromise
offer, the insurer was entitled to look at its own interests
as well as those of thf' insurf'd, stating that if the insurer's interests eonflided with those of the insured, it
18
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was bound, under the standard of good faith, to sacrifice
itR interpsts in favor of the insured. To adopt any other
rnle would make a policy of indemnity a delusion and a
snare, said the court, since in the nature of things when
there was a conflict of interest, as was inevitable under
the circumstances, the company would always give pref<'rencP to its own, and put the insured into the position
of "Heads I win, tails you lose."
Although negligence is not the sole basis in determining the good or bad faith by the insurer it is ce1·tainly a relevant consideration, and in several instances
"good faith'' and negligence appear to have been substantially equated. See 40 A.L.R.2d 183. Traders & Gen('rfll Ins111rance Company vs. Rudco Oil & Gas Company,
( 1942, C. A. 10th Okla.) 129 F.2d 621, 142 A.L.R. 799,
Rtates the rule that the insured is under a duty to exereise good faith in considering an offer of compromise
and its duty under the circumstances includes the obligation of exercising diligence and intelligence. To the
same eff Pct is Royal Transit vs. Central Surety & Insurance Corporation, (1948, C. A. 7th Wis.) 168 F.2d 345,
e<'rt den 335 V.8. 844, 93 L.Ed. 395, 69 S.Ct. 68, Bartlett
11s. Trai"Plers' Insurance Company, 117 Conn. 147, 167
A. 180 (1933).
In A utomolJile Mutual Indemnity Company vs. Sha.w,
1:34 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 ( 1938) the court stated that the
insurt>r in tht> settlement of claims should be held to
that degree of can' and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence should exercist' in the management of his own businesR. No evidence of bad faith on
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the part of the insurer was proven here and the judgment
was reversed in this action.

Lawson & Nelson S & D Company vs. Associated
lndemndy Corporation, 204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481
(1938) applying the "good-faith" test of the insurer's
liability took the vein that the test involves the application of the standard of due care and the exercise of
honest judgment. Mendota Electrical Company vs. New
York Indemnity Company, 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W. 317
(192G) later appealed 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (upon
reasonable grounds for the belief that the amount required to effect a settlement is excessive), Hart vs. Republic 1vlutua,Z Insurance Compa.ny, (1949) 152 Ohio St.
185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (reasonable jusification); Bolenz vs.
New Amsterdam Casnalty Company, (1935) 173 Okla.
60, 46 P.2d 916 (skill, care, and good faith); Southern
Fire & Casualty Compa·ny vs. Norris Ibid (good faith and
diligence); .J. Spong Baking Company vs. Trinity Universal Insurance Company, (1946, App.) 45 Ohio L. Abs.
577, 68 N.E.2d 122 (to act fairly and exercise reasonable
care).
In applying the negligence standard the courts have
ordinarily held that the degree of care required by the
insurance company is that which an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise> in the conduct of his own affairs,
and that the standard is an external one, Dumas vs. Hartford Accident & hidcmnity Company, (1947) 94 N.H.
484, 56 A.2d 57; Wilson rs. Aetna Casiwlty & Siirety
Company, (1950) 1-15 "Me. 370, 76A.2d111; G. A. Stowers
Furnititre Company r;;. American Indemnity Company,
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(1929, Tex. Com. App.) 15 S.W.2d 5-±4, 29 N.C.C.A. 140;
Highway Insurance Underwriters vs. Litfken-Beaumont
Motor Coaches, (1948, Tex. Civ. App. 215 S.W.2d 904;
Jones vs. Highway Inswrance Underwriters, (1952, Tex.
Civ. App.) 253 S.W.2d 1018.
The weight of the evidence against the insured on
the issues of damages and liability is relevant in determining whether the insurer should have compromised
the claim, hence, it has frequently been recognized that
the fact that the claimant had a strong case against
the insured on both the issues of liability and damages
has some tendency to show that the insurer's rejection
of the offer was in bad faith. See 40 A.L.R. 196 et Seq.
and the cases there cited.
An application of the pertinent facts of the instant
ease shows that the jury could reasonably have found
that Farmers Insurance Company did not act in good
faith in not settling Mr. Soliz' claim within the policy
limits when it had an opportunty to do so before the
jury returned its verdict in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case.
The company knew that the claimant had a strong
case against its insured, for its attorney classified the
case as one of liability (Exhibit P-3) and the company
stated in a letter to its attorney that "We have very little
to talk about liability-wise" (Exhibit P-15). In fact,
upon completion of the trial of the Soliz vs. Ammerman
case, in the judge's chambers and prior to the instructions
to the jury, the attorney for l\Ir. Soliz made two motions,
together and in the alternative (T-233 Soliz vs. Ammerman). The first motion \ms that the court direct aver21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

diet in favor of Soliz and against defendant Ammerman
on the ground that Mr. Ammerman was negligent and
that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The second motion, in the alternative, was that
the cow't find as a matter of law that defendant Ammerman was negligent as a matter of law and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident In
response to the motions counsel for the Insurance company representing l\lr. Ammerman stated (T-234 Soliz
vs. Ammerman):
I \\'Ould consent to the granting of the alternative
motion, that the court might find as a matter of
law that the defendant was guilty of negligence
in making a left hand turn and leave the issue
of contributory negligence on the part of Mr.
Soliz to the jury.
Liability then being heavily weighted against Mr. Ammerman, as the company well knew, the only question
was the rangl~ within which the jury verdict in favor of
l\f r. Soliz for is personal injuries could be reasonably
anticipated.
In that regard the testimony of Mr. Soliz and his
wife, relative to his condition prior to the accident, the
pain, suffering and disability after the accident and right
up to the time of trial, are extremely signifcant. Coupled
with this is the testimony of Dr. Bernson, who had examined Mr. Soliz on at least four occasions over a period
of about six months, wherein he said that he could state
unequivocally (emphasis added) that Mr. Soliz had two
ruptured cervical discs which 'vere caused by the accident of March 21, 1962. He was also definite in his opinion that l\fr. Soliz would evmtually require definitive
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treatment to repair the condition, as the disc and liganwntous structure involved are rarely, i:f ever, capable
of healing, and as time went on the discs would degenerate, resulting in the production of more aggravating
symptoms (Exhibit P-7).
Dr. Clegg, the physician for Farmers Insurance Exchange, examined Mr. Soliz on one occasion. He was
not unequivocal in his position as to Mr. Soliz' injury,
hut stated that there was a degenerative change in the
complete spine which could not be attributable to the
single accident of March 21, 1966. Dr. Clegg did not
state unequivocably that Mr. Soliz did not have two ruptured discs from the accident, nor did he state at all
that some part of the condition of Mr. Soliz' spine was
not caused by the accident.
Farmers Insurance Exchange was well aware of
the seriousness of Mr. Soliz' injuries. After having received Dr. Bernson's report, the Company Branch Claims
.Man ager advised the Regional Office:
In view of Dr. Bernson's findings, it appears that
we are going to have a rather difficult time def ending this case, if we do not come up with some
medical testimony which will refiite (emphasis
added) his present diagnosis.
Appellants submit that the testimony of Dr. Clegg did
not refute the diagnosis of Dr. Bernson, nor was it likely
to do so in view of the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Soliz
and the unequivocal diagnosis of Dr. Bernson.
Reed Richards, personal attorney for Mr. Anunerman, realized that liability on the part of the insured
23
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was clear, that Mr. Soliz' injury was substantial, and
the great risk of a judgment in excess of $10,000. His
letter to the company of September 27, 1962, transmitting the summons and complaint to it indicated that (Exhibit P-4); and on September 16, 1963, shortly before the
trial, on behalf of Mr. Ammerman, he made demand upon
the insurance company and its attorneys to settle the
claim of Mr. Soliz for a figure within the limits of the
insurance policy. His demand went unheeded, and was
refused by the company, to Mr. Ammerman's detriment.
Closely associated with the information discussed,
the company had, for its benefit, a report on activity
check which it had arranged to have made on Mr. Soliz
in an effort to determine the extent of his disability and
injury (Exhibt P-1). It can only be inferred that the
information from this check was disastrous, or at least
very unhelpful to the insurance company's position, because the investigator conducting the surveillance of Mr.
Soliz "·as never called to testify at the trial, nor was
the introduction of his report into evidence attempted.
At the trial of the instant matter the insurance company
did not produce the report. 'The jury in this case, of
course, were aware of this development, and apparently
drew their own inferences therefrom.
Of the insurance company's two expert attorney
witnesses, one said that he would have anticipated a verdict of about $7,500 if Dr. Bernson were believed, and
$2,000-$2,500 if Dr. Clegg were believed, but that he
would have attempted to settle the case for between
$5,000 and $6,000. The other expert attorney witness
24
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testified that, in his opinion, the claim of Mr. Soliz was
worth between $6,000 and $7,500.
The attorney representing Fanners Insurance Exchange prior to trial advised the company that if Mr.
Soliz had a herniated disc he valued the claim at $8,500,
and if he didn't have a herniated disc it was worth $3,500
and a settlement of $6,000 was recommended by the
eounsel.
It is further interesting to note that the company
placed a value of $7,500 on the claim and placed a reserve of $5,000 on it, showing that the company was
placing a reserve on the claim considerably lower than
its actual value.

In view of all the evidence produced by the insurance company at the trial of the instant matter, and in
reviewing the evidence most favorable to it, respondents
are of the opinion that the bad faith of the company in
the handling of this claim is an1ply demonstrated. Only
one offer of settlement was made by the company, and
that was for the sum of $4,500 - a figure $3,000 lower
than it thought the case was actually worth, and $500
below its own reserve figure. It is only $1,000 higher
than the value of the casE~ placed on it by the company
attorney if Dr. Clegg was believed in his entirety and
Dr. Bernson, 1\Ir. Soliz and Mrs. Soliz were disbelieved,
whirh would be a highly unlikely occurrence. The one
:-wttlPment offrr made by the insurance company was
also from $500 to $3,000 10\nr than its own expert wit1wsses tPstified tlw easP was worth and what they would
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have offered to settk• the elairn rather than risk a laro-er
b
verdiet at a trial of the case.
Considering tlH· eonduct of the company as above
stated, coupled with the fact that it had two opportunities to settle the case within the policy limits before the
jury returned its verdict - one of which offers was only
$500 above the evaluation figure placed on the claim by
the company attorney if Dr. Bernson was believed the bad faith of the insurance company is manifest. Both
expert attorney witnesses called by plaintiff placed a
settlement value figure on the claim of at least $10,000,
and stated they would have paid the policy limits rather
than try the case. One of the witnesses evaluated the
claim at between $10,000-$12,000 before trial, and the
other said he would have anticipated a verdict of around
$15,000 if the case was tried to a jury. He stated that
before the trial he would have offered to settle the case
for $7,000, but stated that was a "horse-trading" figure.
As trial approached he would have paid the policy limits
rather than try the case.
In discussing the $15,000 verdict of the jury, which
the insurance company claimed was given under passion and prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court stated in
Soliz vs. Ammerman, 16 U.2d 11, 15, 395 P.2d 25 (1964):

Although the verdict of $15,000 general damages
is substantial, we find nothing to indicate passion
or prejudice in view of the evidence of the pains,
suffering, recommendations by plaintiff's doct~rs
to remove injured discs, and the very definite
claims of plaintiff that he did suffer great pains.
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B.l:'spondents feel that, in vww of all the faets involved in this matter, Farmers Insurance Exchange could
have rl:'asonably anticipatl:'d and l:'Xpected that the jury
might believe plaintiff, plaintiff's wife and Dr. Bernson,
disregard the testimony of Dr. Cll:'gg and return a verdict in favor or l\fr. Soliz and against Mr. Ammerman
for a sum in excess of the policy limits. And as stated
by the Utah Supreme Court, a judgment of $15,000 was
for a reasonable amount considering the evidence of the
case.
Following is a representative sampling of the numerous cases where the amounts involved as to policy
coverage, available compromise, and final judgment were
as stated, and where it was held that a liability insurer
was, or could properly be held, liable for wrongful rejection of the compromise offer:

Aniericam Mut. Liabiity Ins. Co. v. Cooper (1932)
CA5th Ala.) 61 F.2d 446, cert den 289 U.S. 736,
77 L.ed. 1-1-83, 53 S.Ct. 595 - policy limits $5,000,
settlement offers of $3,000, $4,000, and $4,500,
final judgment $13,500.
Nohsey v. Amerioan Auto. Ins. Co. (1934, CAGth
Tl:'nn.) 68 F.2d 808 - policy limit of $10,000, action for $40,000, settlement offers of $12,500 and
$10,000 rejected, judgment for $22,500.
Maryland Cas. Co. i;. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co.
(1934 CA8th Mo.) 69 B'.2d 462, cert den 293 U.S.
569, 79 L.cd. 668, 55 S.Ct. 81 - policy limits of
$5,000, action for $200,000, initial compromise off er of $3,500 rejected, as was subsequent compromise off er of $6,500, made after injured employee
had secured verdict for $13,000 on first trial, final
recovery in excess of $12,000.
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co. (1934,
CA8th l\Io.) o9 .F'.2d 6H:i - policy limits of $5,000,
offers of settlement of $360 and $1,000, ultimate
judgment for $10,000.
Brown & McCabe, Stevedores v. London Guaramtee & Acci. Co. (1915, DC Or) 232 .F'.298 - $5,000
policy, offt>r of settlement for $3,000, $12,000 judgment recovered.
Olympia Fiel.ds Country Club vs. Bankers Indem.
Ins. Co. (1945) 325 Ill. App. 649 60 N.E.2d 896 policy limits $10,000, action for $50,000, compromise offer of $3,500 before trial, and of $8,000
after trial verdict for $20,000 was obtained, final
judgment for $20,000.
Ballard v. Citizens Casnalty Co. (1952, CA7th Ill)
19G .F'.2d 96 - policy limit of $2,500, action for
50,000, compromise offers of $2,500 and $2,000,
final judgment for $G,500.
llfcCom/;s v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1935) 231
l\Io. App. 1206 89S.W.2d114-policy limits $5,000,
offer of settlement for $5,000, verdict for $18,000,
reduced on remittur to $13000, finally settled for
$10,000.
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. (1924)
81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 709, 37 A.L.R. 1477 - policy
limits $5,000, offer to settle for $1,500, final judgment for $13,500.
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co. (1929, Tex. Com. App.) 15 SW.2d 544, 29
N.C.C.A 140 - $5,000 policy coverage, action for
$20,000, offer to settle for $4,000, final judgment
for $14,000.

ReRpondents submit that by the application of the
"good-faith'' rule or the negligence rule the insurance
company is found wainting in its conduct, as the jury
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found it was, and that it is liable for the full amount of
thP judgment rendered against its insured.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE, OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT, THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DEFENDANT
AND ITS ATTORNEY.

At the trial of the instant case, plaintiffs in that
matter, respondents herein, served a subpoena duces
tecurn on the insurance company and the counsel for the
insurance company, ordering them to appear in court
and bring at that time their files and correspondence
relating to the Soliz vs. Ammerman case. Counsel for
the insurance company objected to the use of that material in the instant case on the ground that its recommendations to the company were confidential and privileged. The trial court overruled the objection, stating
that the company counsel's evaluation and recommendation relating to the Soliz claim was material and not
confidential in this case, because the evaluation, recomnwndations and opinion of counsel to the insurance
company goes to the question of the latter's good or bad
faith (R-146-147). In the opinion of respondents the ruling of the trial court was correct.
The so-called attorney-client privilege found in 7824-8 ( 2) U.C.A. 1953, and referred to by the insurance
company in its brief, is not, nor is it intended to be, an
absolute privilege any more than the so-called hu:sbandwif e privilege, 78-24-8 (1) U.C.A., 1953, is intended to be.
There is an exception to the attorney-client privilege
rule where the application of the privilege rule by ex-
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eluding confidential ('Omrnunications between the attorney anrl client would be injurious to the attorney's
intP·rests. In this regard, the rulP as to the privilege
has no application where the client in an action against
the attorney charges negligence or malpractice. 58 Am.
itr., Witnesses, Section 514, p. 287-288 and the cases there
cited. The privilege is that of the client, not the attorney,
and is to be claimed or waived by it if it is not a party
in court. In this case, of course, the insurance company
was a party to the action. Nor can the communications
betwt-en the insurance company and its counsel relating
to the lattt-r's evaluation of tlw case, opinions and advise
bi• construed to he the work product of the attorney under
the provisions of Rule 30(b) Utah Rules of Civil Proct-dnre.

Graben vs. Travelers Indemnity Company, 266
N.Y.S.2d 616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1965) was an action by the
plaintiff against the insurer for bad faith on the part
of the insurance company for its refusal to settle a claim
whNein the discovery was sought of the insurance company's file, including the reserve established by it and
the corrt-spondence between the company and the State
Irnmrance Department in respect to the reserve. The
eourt held that the produetion of the file was not precluded by the "work-produet" rule or the "attorney-client
privilege" rule.
With respect to the rest-rve and correspondence by
tht• insurance company and the State Department of
Insurance in respeet to it, the court stated:
Presumably, these items could be material and
necessary to the action as an admission against
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interest as to defendant's knowledge and evaluation of the case. It can be argued that this was
an internal matter of the insurer not related to
the preparation of hte legal defense of the actions.
However, examvnation with respect to the reserve
may develop evidence on the issue of defendant's
bod faith. (Emphasis added)
Bad faith is a state of mind which must be established by circumstantial evidence. The actions
of defendant in respect to the reserve are relevant. Negligent investigation and uniformed
evaluation of the worth of the Rosen claims goes
to the heart of the case since serious and recurring
negligence can be indicative of bad faith. Defendant's actions on the reserve may have a direct
bearing on the issue.

Colbert vs. Home Indemnity Company, 259 N.Y.S.
2d 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) was also an action against
an insurance company for its bad faith refusal to settle
a claim for a reasonable amount. Plaintiff sought discovery of the insurance company's files. The court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to discover the company's
files, but only as to documents specifically designated by
plaintiff. Production of the insurer's files was not precluded either by the "work-product" rule or the "attorney-client" privilege.
Chitty vs. State Farm Midu.al Automobile lnsur.amce
Company, 36 F.R.D. 37 (Ed. S.C. 1964) was an action
hy the insured against his insurer for negligence and bad
faith in failing to settle a claim against him. The court
indicated that the plaintiff-insured was entitled to inspect the documents and records in the defendant-insurer's files in order to determine what investigation the
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company made of this case, whether it rejected advice
and reconunendations of its own agents, adjusters and
attorneys. Production of the insurer's files was not
precluded either by the "attorney-client" privilege or the
"work-product" rule.
Other than the cases cited herein, respondent has
been unable to locate any others relating to this question.
Respondent respectfully asserts that the cases cited
by appellant in its brief on this question are either not
contrary to the position taken by the courts in the cases
cited herein, or are not applicable. Farm Bureau Midual
Insurance Company vs. Anderson, 360 S.W.2d 314 (Missouri, 1962) supports respondent's position, for that case
states that communications between the insurance company's branch manager and its attorney, relating to
contemplated litigation, was not privileged if the communication took place in the ordinary course of business.
I~ the instant case the communications between Farmers Insurance Exchange and its attorneys took place
in the ordinary course of business, since the communication dealt with the evaluation of the claim and opinions as to liability thereon. The selling of automobile
liability insurance, adjustment of claims against its insured, evaluation and payment of claims, and defense
of other claims are in the ordinary course of business
of Farmers Insurance Exchange.
The cases of Meleo System vs. Receivers of Transamerica Insnrancc Company, 105 So. 2d 43 (Alabama,
1958); Continental Casualty Company vs. Pogorzelski,
82 N.,Y.2d 183 (Wisconsin, 1957); General Accident Fire
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wnd Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. vs. Mitchell, 259 Pac. 2d

SG2 (Colorado, 1953) and Emerson vs. Western Auto-

mobile Indemnity Association, 182 Pac. 647 (Kansas,
1919) are not in point, since none of those cases involve
actions against the insurance company by the insured,
or a judgment creditor of the insured, where the negligence or bad faith of the company is an issue.
Inasmuch as the good or bad faith of appellant,
Fanners Insurance Exchange, for failure to evaluate
and settle the claim against Mr. Ammerman, its insured,
was a vital issue in the case on appeal herein, the communications between the company and its attorney were
not privileged and the trial court properly ordered production of the documents and their use as evidence in
the trial.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF SOLIZ FROM THIS ACTION.

The policy of insurance issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to Edward vV. Amerman contains the
following provision:
CONDITIONS
( 6) Action Against the Company
... As respects the insurance afforded under
Coverages A and B, whenever judgment is
secured against the insured or the executor
or administrator of a deceased insured in an
action based upon bodily injury, death, or
property damage, then an action may be
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brought against the Company on the policy
and subject to ih; terms and limitations, by
such judgment creditor to recover on the
judgment . . . (R-55).
Coverages A and B under this policy relate to claims
against the insured for bodily injury and property damage.
It 1s obvious that tlw prov1s10n of the insurance
policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange referred
to permits actions hy a judgment creditor of the insured
against the company. The judgment creditor of the insured, in this case J\Ir. Soliz, is a third party beneficiary
of thP contract entered into between the insurance company and Mr. Amnwrman, and his right to bring a direct
action against Farmers Insurance Exchange arises out
of a contractual provision and not an assignment of a
claim by the insured nor a statutory provision. The fact,
then, that tort claims are unassignahle in Utah, as claimed
by appellant, is completely irrelevant and has nothing
to do with resolving the question before the Court.

It has been generally held by courts deciding the
question that an injured third party pressing a claim
against an insured has a right to recover against the
latters liability insurance carrier for its bad faith or
negligent failure to accept a reasonable compromise offer
if the policy of insurance contains a provision permitting him to do so, or giving him the same rights against
the insurer enjoyed by the insured. Statutes giving the
third party claimant this right or a provision in the
insuranee policy to that effect ereates a contractual re34
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laton which inures to the benefit of any and every person
who may be negligently injured by the insured, as completely as if such injured person were specifically named
in the policy. See 29A Am. Jur. Insurance, Sec. 1486 and
the cases there cited. And as to the extent of the recovery of an injured person under the so-called direct
action against the company provision, the general rule
is that such recovery is the same as the insured could
recover if the judgment of the insured had been fully
satisfied. 29A Am. Jur., Insurance, Section 1487.
In Kleinschmit vs. Farmers Mutual Hail InS'Ulf'Ohl,Ce
Association, (1939, C.A. 8th Neb.) 101F.2d987, the court
stated that if the insured has an action against the insurer based on a bad-faith failure to compromise a
claim, the injured third person would also have an action
against the insurer for the excess of the judgment recovered over the policy coverage, under a policy provi~ion that in case an execution against the insured on
final judgment was returned unsatisfied, the judgment
creditor should have a right of action against the insurer
to the same extent the insured would have had had he
paid the judgment. Under the particular facts of this
case, however, the insured was held not to have had a
cause of action.

Automobile Mutual Indemnity Company vs. Shaw,
134: Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938) held that the injured
party, who had recovered a judgment against the insured in excess of the policy limits, would be entitled
to recover the full amount of his judgment from the
insurer, upon a showing that the insurer was chargeable
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with bad faith in refusing to negotiate a settlement. The
policy provided that where the judgment could not be
collected against the insured, the judgment creditor would
he vt•sted with tht> insured's rights against the insurer.
The case of Dillingham vs. Tri-State Insurance ComprM1y, :381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964-), which appellant cites

as :,;upporting its position in this matter, in fact supports respondt>nt 's postion. The court stated that in thP
cast's allowing a judgment creditor to maintain an action
directly against the insurance company there was a
provision in the insnrnce policy entitling the judgment
creditor to recover to the same extent that the insured
could have done. In the case on appeal heren, the polic~·
i:,;sned h:· the appellant contains a provision permitting
the judgment creditor to bring an action directly against
the insurance company.
Those cases cited in appellant's brief stating that a
judgment creditor may not maintain a direct action
against thP insurer in the absence of a statute or provision in the policy permitting it to do so are inapplicable and eannot he cted as supporting the proposition
Rtated in Point III of appPllant's brief.
SPe also Seaboard Mutual Casualty Compmiy vs.
Profit (4th Civ. Md.) 108 F.2d 597 to the effect that a
judgment creditor of the insured may maintain a direct
action against the insurance company under a provision
in the policy permitting him to do so.
The case of Paul 1:s. Kirkendall, 6 Ut. 2d 256, 311
P.2d 37G (1957) cited by appPllant in Point III of its
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brief to support its position is also inapplicable to the
question involved herein. In that case an injured third
party had obtained a judgment against the insured for
an amount in excess of the policy limits. Judgment
<'reditor thereafter instituted garnishment proceedings
against the judt,rinent debtor's insurance carrier in an
attempt to recover the amount of the judgment in exeess of the eoverage limits. The court held that the
judgment debtor's tort claim against the garnishee insurance carrier could not be adjudicated in the garnishment proceeding.
The Kirkendall case is distinguishable from the
instant case in that in that case the liability of the insurance company for the amount of the judgment in excess
of the policy limits, which was the sub3ect of the garnishment proceedings, had never been litigated. It was
deemed to be an unliquidated tort claim, the liability
for which had not been detennined. Therefore, the uneertainty of the liability of the insurance company for
the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy
limits, because of its bad faith refusal to settle the injun'd party's claim against its insured, prohibited a
garnishee judgment against the insurance carrier.
In the instant case, the purpose of the trial was
to litigate tlw question of the bad faith of Farmers Insurance Exchange and thereby determine legally its obligation for the amount of the judgment in excess of the
polic>· limits. Appellant's liability was established at
the trial and resolved in favor of respondents.
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If, however, in reviewing the matter most favorably
to appellant, it could be said that permitting Mr. Soliz
to maintain an action against the insurance company was
error, it certainly cannot reasonably be said to have
heen prejudicial to appellant. It must be conceded that
Mr. Ammerman is entitled to bring an action against
his insurance company for its bad faith refusal to settle
the claim of Mr. Soliz against him. He is a party to
thf' contract of insurance with appellant; he demanded
that the company settle the claim within the limits of
his insurance coverage; he was a party with Mr. Soliz
in the action against Farmers Insurance Exchange on
thl:' claim for bad faith refusal to settle the injured party's claim; he was represented by his own attorney in
the action against the insurance company; and he recovered a judgment against Farmers Insurance Exchange
in the instnt case. The fact that Mr. Ammerman did not
appear personally at the trial cannot be said to have
heen prejudicial to appellant, because the insurance company could have compelled his appearance at the trial,
by means of a subpoena, and could have called him as a
witness to testify in the case. If prejudice did result
from Mr. Ammerman's non-appearance at the trial, the
appellant must shoulder the responsibility for it and cannot now be heard to complain about its own omission.
That the law firm of Kipp and Charlier represented
Mr. Soliz in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case and the case
of Soliz and Ammerman vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange
cannot hl-' said to have been prejudicial to appellant.
However, if appellant so claims, counsel for respondent
Soliz assumes that the prejudice claimed resulted from
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the ablilities of the firm. While modesty prompts a
denial of the prejudice claim, the compliment is graciously accepted. It certanly is not true that the law firm
of Kipp and Charlier represented Mr. Ammerman; for
in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case he was represented by
the law firm of Hanson and Garrett, counsel for Farmers
Insurance Exchange, and by his own private counsel,
Mr. Reed H. Richards; and in the case on appeal herein,
he was represented by Mr. Reed H. Richards (R-138,
T-1).
In concluding its argument under Point III of its
brief, appellant contends that Mr. Soliz was an improper
party to the lawsuit (1) because he had no rights by
assignment or otherwise over and above the policy
amount, and (2) he suffered no damage, since he offered
to settle the case before trial for $9,000, and had the
insurance company accepted that offer Mr. Soliz would
have received $1,000 less than he has received to date.
In answer to the first contention, the law clearly is that
because of the policy provisions ref erred to, permitting
a judgment creditor of the insured to bring a direct action
against the insurance company, Mr. Soliz was a proper
party to this law suit. Appellant's second contention is
unbelievable. Prior to preparation for trial, and even
after preparation but before trial, Mr. Soliz offered to
settle for $9,000. This, respondent Soliz feels, was a bargain offer made to avoid a trial which entails considerable time, effort, personal and emotional involvement,
and the dislike of most people to go through a trial.
Having had this offer rejected by Farmers Insurance
Exchange, having gone through the trial and having re-
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cPived a judgment against J\l r. Ammerman for $15,000,
respond<>nt Soliz has heen damaged by not rPceiving the
full amount he is entitled legally to receive. Prior to
Uw trial, appellant could have taken advantage of Mr.
Soliz' bargain off E>r of $9,000. It refused to do so, and
now bargain day is past. Appellant cannot now claim
npon any ba::;is that Mr. Soliz has not suffered any damage or is better off by the company's not accepting his
offer. By the same token, had the insurance company
acct>ph'd the reasonable offer of $9,000 its insured would
not have been put in the prejudicial position of having
a $15,000 jud1-:,11nent against him, and appellant would
not he in the position of having a judgment against it
for the t>xcess amount of the policy limits. If appellant
has lwen prejudicE>d in any way, such prejudice has been
the result of its own conduct.
ThP trial court did not err in permitting Mr. Soliz
to rmrnin in the action as a party plaintff, and in any
evPnt if the action of the trial court was error in this
rpgard, it was not prejudicial to aPiwllant. Thus appellant is not Pntitled to a nE>w trial, sincP no prejudicial
error was committed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this case was sufficient
to suhmit to the jury the question of appellant's bad faith
in its refusal to settle the Soliz claim within the Ammerman insurance policy limits. Ths the trial court properl:·
did. Negligence is an elPmPnt of had faith, and certainly
the record supports the condud of the trial court in per

40
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mitting the jurors to consider this aspect of the bad
faith claim. Sorm~ courts have said that fraudulent intent
or dishonesty are elements of bad faith. Respondents
ar<> of the opinion that the evidence presented a jury
question as to whether either or both of these elements
were present, and a jury could have reasonably found
that they did. The insurance company refused to offer
:\Ir. Soliz the amount that it thought his claim was worth,
viz. $5,000, that being the figure it put on its reserve
relating to this claim. It made only one settlement offer
in the amount of $4,500, which was considerably below
what its own counsel and its experts stated the case was
worth for settlement purposes. The only offer made was
only $1,000 above the figure the company thought it
could get by with paying if the testimony of its doctor
relative to Mr. Soliz' condition was believed in its entirety
and the testimony of Mr. Soliz, Mrs. Soliz and Dr. Bernson completely disregarded. Appellant's attorney advised it that if Mr. Soliz had a ruptured disc his claim
was worth $8,500. This is a figure only $500 less than
it could have settle the case for. If the claim was worth
$8,500 appellant could not have expected to get off for
an amount ess than $9,000, since it would have to pay
its counsel for trying the case, plus all investigation and
eourt costs. Apparently the insurance company decided
to gamble on this case in the hope that it could save
money, and in doing so gambled to the prejudice of Mr.
Ammerman, its insured. And again, appellant had an
activity check on Mr. Soliz by a private investigator who
was to report to the Claims :Manager of Farmers Insurance Exchange. The activity check was made, hut there
was a deathly silence by thr company on the results of it.
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Surely had the surveillance activities of the investigator
helped to establish that Mr. Soliz was not injured badly,
appellant would have called the investigator to testify at
the trial in support of its doctor. The investigator was
not called, nor was his report introduced into evidence
for the jury's consideration. Respondents contend that
these facts present a question of good faith for the jury's
determination, because reasonable minds could differ on
whether the conduct of appellant involved fraudulent or
dishonest intent in their handling of the case as it related
to settlement of the Soliz claim.
Respondents respectfully assert that in view of the
facts in this case and the law, the action of the trial
judge and the verdict of the jury were proper and correct.
Therefore, the jury verdict should remain undisturbed,
and the orders of the trial judge in denying appellant's
several motions should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
Carman E. Kipp, Esq.
Tel Charlier, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
Eddie Soliz
Reed H. Richards, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
Edward Wilson Ammerman
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